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Policy Research Working Paper 5015
The author examines the impact of historical global 
downturns on trade flows. The results provide insight 
into why trade has dropped so dramatically in the current 
crisis, what is likely to happen in the coming years, how 
global imbalances are affected, and which regions and 
industries suffer most heavily. The author finds that the 
elasticity of global trade volumes to real world GDP has 
increased gradually from around 2 in the 1960s to above 
3 now. The author also finds that trade is more responsive 
to GDP during global downturns than in tranquil times. 
This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to understand the implications of the global economic crisis for international trade flows. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at cfreund@
worldbank.org.  
The results suggest that the overall drop in real trade this 
year is likely to exceed 15 percent. There is significant 
variation across industries, with food and beverages the 
least affected and crude materials and fuels the most 
affected. On the positive side, trade tends to rebound 
very rapidly when the outlook brightens. The author 
also finds evidence that global downturns often lead to 
persistent improvements in the ratio of the trade balance 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The financial crisis is wreaking havoc on the global economy. In the first quarter of 2009, 
nominal trade fell by 30 percent on average since last year.   The world trade volume is 
estimated to have fallen by over 15 percent during this period (World Trade Monitor & 
League of Nations).   The declines have been widespread across countries and products, 
largely reflecting the sharp drop in global demand. 
We examine historical data on global slowdowns to look for similarities that may 
offer insights into the large decline in trade that has already begun.  There are four such 
events in recent history: 1975, 1982, 1991, and 2001.  While these events were on 
average modest as compared with the current crisis, they may offer some guidance for 
what to expect in the coming months.  We focus on global downturns, as opposed to 
financial crises, because these share the key characteristic (for international trade) of low 
global demand with the current environment.  In contrast, during regional financial crises, 
demand in the rest of the world tends to remain strong, limiting the trade impact of the 
crisis.  We also examine a handful of countries, which experienced financial crises during 
the 1991 global downturn, to determine whether banking crises significantly exacerbate 
weak trade performance during slowdowns. 
The first issue we address is how much does trade contract when the global 
economy falters?  We find that the trade contraction follows the GDP decline and that the 
trade volume declines by about 1 percent on average in first year of its contraction. The 
decline in the growth rate of trade (from historical average to trough) is sudden and is on 
average more than 4 times as large as that of income.  On average, trade growth returns   3
as quickly as it disappears and contemporaneously with the rebound in GDP growth.  
Still, it takes more than three years for pre-downturn levels of openness to be reached. 
As a result of the collapse in trade, crises moderate global imbalances.  Since 
trade contracts by more than GDP, a country’s trade balance as a share of GDP (whether 
surplus or deficit) typically declines in absolute value.  Moreover, because of falling 
commodity prices during downturns, the deceleration in trade value tends to be far 
greater than in trade volumes.  We show that the reversal of trade deficits tends to persist 
for Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East.  In North America, the 
improvement in the trade balance has been temporary, with deficits worsening following 
the downturn. In contrast, surplus regions tend to see only a temporary reversal. 
We also examine characteristics across industries and regions during the 
slowdown. While all industries tend to decline, it is least severe in food and beverages.  
Growth returns after one year in most products, though iron and steel and commodities 
exhibit more protracted slowdowns.  By region, countries in Europe and Central Asia 
were relatively less affected during previous downturns; while those in the Middle East 
and North Africa were the most affected.  By income level, the high income OECD 
countries were least affected; while middle income countries were the most affected.    
The results have important implications for trade during the current financial 
crisis.  Given current GDP forecasts and trade data available through June, our results 
imply that the decline in real trade in 2009 could well exceed 15 percent.   In addition, 
global imbalances are likely to be mitigated during the crisis, and this may persist even 
after the crisis is resolved.  Finally, food and beverages are likely to be the least affected 
products in the coming months.     4
This paper in similar in spirit to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).  They examine 
previous financial crises for information on the macroeconomic implications of the 
current crisis.  They find that banking crises are associated with severe declines in asset 
prices, output, and employment—though the decline in output tends to be relatively less 
protracted as compared with asset prices and employment.  They also find that 
government debt balloons as a result of collapsing tax revenues and countercyclical 
policies.  While our focus on global downturns and international trade is quite different 
from theirs, there is one important similarity in our results.  Our results point to a sharp 
but relatively short-lived decline in trade, akin to what they find for output.  A significant 
difference is that unlike the expanding government debt they observe, we find that 
international borrowers often reduce international debt following global downturns. 
  
II.  Methodology 
Following Milessi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Freund (2005) on current account 
reversals, we use a filter to identify episodes of global downturns.  Specifically, a global 
downturn must satisfy the following criteria: 
(a)  World real GDP growth below 2 percent. 
(b)  A drop of more than 1.5 percentage points in world real GDP growth 
from previous 5 year average to current rate.   
 
(c)  Considering the previous 2 years and the following 2 years, growth is 
at a minimum. 
 
The first two conditions ensure growth is low and has dropped sharply.  If the first two 
conditions identify consecutive years, i.e. prolonged recessions, the final condition 
chooses the minimum growth rate as the event year.  Using data on real GPD (in constant   5
$US, base year 2000) and real imports (in constant $US, base year 2000) from the World 
Development Indicators since 1960, four events are identified:  1975, 1982, 1991, and 
2001.  These events are readily seen as the sharp downturns in Figure 1.  In the remainder 
of this note, the downturn year is denoted as year zero. 
 
III.  What Happens to Trade During Downturns? 
To estimate trade effects of recessions, we need an estimate of the elasticity of 
trade to income—the percentage by which trade falls for a one percent change in income.  
A number of papers have estimated income elasticities of imports or exports for 
individual countries and generally find them to lie between 1 and 3½ (see, for example, 
Hooper et. Al 2000 and Kwack et. Al. 2007).   Most forecasters use an elasticity of about 
2: real trade growth is expected to slow by 2 percentage points for each 1 percentage 
point deceleration in real income growth.  This leads to relatively small estimates of the 
decline in trade relative to what we have seen.  For example, the IMF
1 predicts a 2.8 
percent decline in real trade.  In June, the World Bank
2 revised its March forecast from a 
6.1 percent decline in real trade to a 9.7 percent contraction, only after reducing sharply 
the forecast for global growth.  The World Bank estimates are larger in magnitude than 
the IMF estimate because the predicted declines in income growth are greater.  In 
addition, the Bank’s estimate is augmented with potential effects from trade finance 
problems.   
In Table 1, we reexamine the relationship between trade growth and income 
growth.  Specifically, we estimate a very simple regression of world real trade growth on 
                                                 
1 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/update/01/index.htm. 
2 See http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=659149&pagePK=2470434&contentMD 
K =20370063&menuPK=659159&piPK=2470429.   6
world real GDP growth.  We find that the elasticity of trade to income has increased over 
time, from under 2 in the 1960s to over 3½.  These results are very similar to Irwin 
(2002).  Using a slightly different methodology, he estimates that that the elasticity of 
world trade to income has grown over time, and was also about 3.4 in the 1990s.  Overall, 
the results imply that trade should fall (in percent) about 3½ times as much as GDP, 
assuming crises are not special.   
The significant increase in the elasticity of trade to income may be attributed to 
the fragmentation of production and/or lean retailing.  Because many new goods use 
small inputs that are nearly costless to trade (eg cell phones and digital cameras), the 
production process of these goods has become fragmented across countries.  Many 
traditional goods such as shoes and cars are also increasingly incorporating imported 
inputs.  The elasticity of trade to GDP will rise if there is more incentive to outsource part 
of the production chain when demand is high.  This is because GDP is measured in value 
added while trade is a gross measure.  So an increase in GDP may lead to more 
outsourcing and much more measured trade, as an increasing number of parts travel 
around the globe to be assembled, and again to their final consumer. 
The expansion of lean retailing in recent years implies that supply responds 
almost immediately to changes in demand.  Rapid technological advances make 
computers and other electronics almost perishable, and many companies have started 
selling directly to the consumer and producing for demand. For example, Dell sells 
directly to its customers and builds a made-to-order computer as orders arrive.
3  This type 
of retailing implies that a drop in demand will show up immediately in trade statistics.  
                                                 
3 Arthur, J. (2006), Chapter 2 p. 25.    7
Table 2 examines the elasticity of a region’s exports to global income.  The 
intuition for looking at regional trade and global income (instead of regional income) is to 
see how tied a region’s exports are to the global economy.  To the extent that the increase 
in the world elasticity of trade to income is a result of greater fragmentation we should 
see especially large numbers for East Asia.  Indeed, East Asia records the largest 
elasticity in the recent period, as well as the largest change in elasticity, suggesting that 
fragmentation is in part responsible.  It also implies that East Asia may be the most 
affected region as a result of trade linkages during the current downturn.  The growth in 
the elasticity in this region is also likely connected to China’s phenomenal growth in 
assembly of manufactures over the period.  Still, as the OECD is responsible for the bulk 
of world trade, the global elasticity also closely mirrors that of the OECD.  In contrast 
trade in the low income countries does not significantly respond to world income. 
Trade may respond differently to GDP during global downturns.  Figure 2 shows 
real trade growth and real GDP growth in the years around the previous global crises.  
We report the mean and the median to ensure that results are not driven by an outlier.  
While income growth falls to 1.5 percent, trade growth becomes negative, declining by 
about one percent.  (Real trade growth was negative only in 1975 and 1982.) In addition, 
the decline in growth from the previous year to the crisis year is much larger for trade.  
GDP growth declines on average by 1.5 percentage points from previous year, while real 
trade declines on average by 7.2 percentage points, nearly 4.7 times as much.  If during 
this downturn, we see a similar ratio there would be a decline of about nearly 20 percent 
in real trade this year, given the World Bank’s current GDP forecast.
4  
                                                 
4 Using an elasticity of trade to income during the downturn of between 4.7 and a deceleration in real world 
income growth of 4.8 percentage points (the World Bank estimate), the deceleration is real trade growth   8
These results imply that trade responds more sharply to GDP during global 
slowdowns than during tranquil times.  There are a number of potential explanations:  (i) 
firms may draw down accumulated inventories sharply when the forecast worsens in an 
unexpected and dramatic way.  (ii) When global GDP drops sharply, protectionist 
policies kick in which exacerbate the decline in trade.  (iii) During downturns, goods 
decline by more than services and services make up the bulk of GDP, while goods make 
up the bulk of trade.  Moreover, the share of services in GDP has increased over time 
magnifying this distinction.  (iv) Trade is measured in gross value and GDP in value 
added.  A large decline in trade could reflect a much smaller decline in the value added if 
production is done across countries at the margin, and as demand falls international 
production chains break down.
5  And (v) people may tend to source relatively more from 
home country suppliers during downturns because of trust or financing problems.    
On the positive side, we find that trade tends to achieve most of its adjustment in 
one year also when it rebounds.  The quick rebound likely reflects the reversal of many of 
the conditions above. Figure 3 looks at trade’s share of income over the episodes to see 
how global openness changes over time.  We find that it takes about 4 years for trade to 
pass pre-downturn levels. 
Finally, we examine whether countries with banking crises are affected more 
severely or differently during a downturn.  We focus on three countries, Finland, Sweden, 
                                                                                                                                                 
would be 23 percentage points.  World real trade growth in 2008 was about 4 percent, yielding a 
contraction this year of 19 percent.   
5 An example of this is Porsche which is cutting outsourcing to Finland during the crisis, while maintaining 
German production (New York Times, April 4, 2009).  In a related point, Yi (2009) argues that vertical 
specialization leads to a more synchronized transmission of shocks across countries, because trade is 
directly linked to the production chain. Note that increasing vertical specialization can explain why trade 
has expanded faster than income in recent years, but a higher level of vertical specialization cannot explain 
why the elasticity of trade to income is higher.     9
and Japan that experienced severe banking crises around 1991, when there was also an 
episode of slow world income growth.
6   
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show real GDP, real exports, and real imports, respectively, for 
the three countries and the world during this episode.  Income and imports fell much 
more sharply for the crisis countries than for the rest of the world.   Exports fell by just 
about the same amount as world trade, suggesting that the aggregate exports of the crisis 
countries were no more affected by the global downturn than exports in the rest of the 
world.
7  Exports rebounded far more rapidly than income, rejoining world growth rates 
after just one year.  Even imports expanded more than one-third of the full amount in the 
first year after the downturn began, despite negative income growth.  All three variables, 
exports, imports, and GDP, returned to average world growth levels after 3 years.  This 
suggests that financial crises do exacerbate trade effects during downturns, but the 
relatively quick rebound in trade remains intact in these countries.   
 
IV.  How Are Trade Balances Affected? 
Given that trade falls more than income, it is likely that global imbalances as a share of 
GDP improve.  This will be true unless exports fall by much more than imports in deficit 
countries and imports fall by much more than exports in surplus countries.  In this 
section, we examine whether there is an improvement in global imbalances and whether 
it is shortlived or persistent. 
                                                 
6 Finland (1991) Sweden(1991), and Japan(1992) are included in the “big five” crises, the other two are 
Spain (1977) and Norway (1987).  
7 Iacovone and Zavacka (forthcoming) find that there are compositional effects of banking crises on 
exports.  Export growth in sectors that depend relatively more on external finance declines relative to 
growth in other sectors in the aftermath of the crisis.   10
To evaluate global imbalances we examine the trade balance as a share of GDP 
across regions and income groups, and also whether the countries tend to be surplus or 
deficit countries.  Figure 7 and 8 show movements in the aggregate trade deficit and 
surplus for international borrowers and lenders, respectively.  Specifically, Figure 7 is the 
aggregate trade deficit relative to GDP over time of all the countries that had a deficit 
before the downturn.
8 Similarly, Figure 8 is the aggregate trade surplus relative to GDP 
over time of all the countries that had a surplus before the downturn. On aggregate, there 
is only a temporary improvement, and the position quickly returns to where it was before 
the episode.   This suggests that there is not an overall rebalancing between pre-downturn 
surplus countries and pre-downturn deficit countries. 
However, the pictures are very different when we look across regions (Figures 9 
and 10) or income groups (Figures 11 and 12).  We find that in Latin America, East Asia, 
Europe and the Middle East and North Africa there is a tendency to reduce sharp deficits 
following downturns.  These are regions where the imbalances were deemed dangerous, 
and the government put policies in place to ensure they did not reemerge.  These included 
savings incentives and maintaining an undervalued exchange rate to strengthen the BOP 
position.  In addition, weakened firm fundamentals during a global downturn may induce 
a drop in investment. 
In contrast, North America tends to show a relatively stable account that improves 
slightly during the downturn, but worsens in its aftermath.  This may reflect the flexibility 
of the U.S. economy and the safety of dollar assets.  This may also be related to the 
                                                 
8 Specifically, we use the value of deficit or surplus four years before the episode to characterize country as 
a surplus or deficit country.  Data are from the IMF BOP Statistics for a balanced sample of countries 
reporting.     11
downturns not having been severe enough to change U.S. government policies and firm 
fundamentals, as happened in middle-income and developing borrower countries. 
Surplus countries, by contrast, in general show only temporary reversals.  Unlike 
deficit countries where there may be pressure to change policies and investment behavior 
following a costly recession and capital outflow, surplus countries do not experience such 
an impetus for change. 
 
V.  Which Products Are Most Affected? 
To examine product level data, we use trade value data reported by Comtrade and convert 
data to constant dollars using the US CPI index (base year 2000). Figure 13 shows trade 
growth across the episodes.  We see on average a 5 percent decline real merchandise 
trade as compared with the 1 percent decline in aggregate trade volume.
9  This largely 
reflects the effect of exchange rates and commodity prices, both of which are better 
accounted for in the real trade in goods and services, as measured above. In addition, the 
shape is different, with a more gradual improvement, in part reflected the protracted 
decline in commodity prices. 
Figure 14 shows export growth by product.  While all industries exhibit a 
slowdown, it is least severe in food and beverages.  In addition, trade in some durable 
goods, such as washing machines, driers and refrigerators, drop less sharply though take 
much longer to recover.  In part, this could reflect a slower decline and recovery, as 
orders need to be placed in advance. Trade in automobiles shows a slow dip and a quick 
                                                 
9 The aggregate real trade figures above are converted from real local currency series using one exchange 
rate into dollars and then summed—this means that these series will be different. The real local series take 
into account price fluctuations in imports.   In addition, the aggregate figures include services trade.     12
recovery.  While growth returns after one year in most products, iron and steel and 
commodities tend to exhibit more protracted slowdowns.   
Already some similar patterns are emerging in current data.  Data at the industry 
level for the United States and Japan through March show foodstuffs among the least 
affected, with metals and mineral products the most affected. 
 
VI.  What Regions Are Most Affected? 
Figure 15 shows export value growth by region.  In previous crises, the Middle East and 
North Africa has been most affected and Europe and Central Asia has been least affected; 
while other regions show remarkably similar patterns.  Europe may be less affected 
because in-built social safety nets ensure against a sharp drop in spending and most 
exports are within the region.  By income group, the least affected are the high income 
OECD and the low income countries (Figure 16).    
The results from Section III suggest that exports from Asia are likely to fall 
relatively more rapidly during downturns because of the high elasticity of trade to 
income, however, we do not find this to be the case.   This may be because downturns are 
different.  First, they tend to affect petroleum and commodities exporters most heavily, 
which Asia does not export.  Second, while expanding world income has facilitated 
greater fragmentation of production and rapid trade growth in Asia, it is unclear that a 
temporary decline in income would reverse this trend, as there are large sunk investment 
costs to building production chains. 
 
VII.  Conclusion and Looking Forward   13
  Trade has fallen dramatically since the onset of the financial crisis in the fall.  
Figure 17 compares trade growth (month over same month the previous year) in this 
crisis and in the previous downturns, using monthly data in constant $US, for a balanced 
sample of 31 countries that report data from January 1960-March 2009.
10  While growth 
leading up to the crisis was a bit higher in this episode, it still looked quite similar to the 
previous downturns.  What is most evident from the picture is that the trade drop over the 
last few months has been much steeper and more severe than other recent episodes.   
  This note has offered some background on why the trade drop has been so large.  
We argue that the elasticity of trade to income has been increasing over time and that 
during recessions trade is especially responsive to income.  On the positive side, we note 
that trade tends to rebound sharply when growth picks up.  This is similar to the result in 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) that output declines resulting from a financial crises last only 
two years, as compared with about 4 years for employment and equity drops. 
  We have also seen that downturns tend to moderate global imbalances.  However, 
the moderation tends to be temporary unless the downturn alters investment attitudes 
and/or government policies.  Given that the downturn will get the process started, we 
hope that governments can use the transition to install policies that will ensure that 
imbalances do not revert to pre-crisis trends.  This will include policies to encourage 
saving in the United States and prevent an overvalued dollar, and policies to stimulate 
spending in China and other parts of Asia and prevent undervalued currencies.   
 
                                                 
10 Month zero is the minimum trade growth during previous downturns.  The series for the current period is 
matched to previous downturns using the maximum in trade growth.  Specifically, the maximum trade 
growth before this downturn began is superimposed over the maximum trade growth on average before the 
previous downturns (month -20).   14
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Table 2: Elasticity of Exports to World Income, by Region 
 
Full 1960s 1970s 1980a 1990s 2000s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dlngdp 1.77*** 1.94** 2.13** 2.75*** 3.36*** 3.69***
[0.25] [0.81] [0.78] [0.19] [0.47] [0.40]
Observations 45 9 10 10 10 6
































Figure 1: Real GDP Growth 
 
   Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure 2:  Real Trade and Real GDP 
 
   Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure 3:  World Trade over GDP 
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Figure 4:  Real GDP Growth in 1991 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. C3  
are the three countries, Finland Japan and Sweden that had  
extensive banking  crises at the same time. 
 
Figure 5:  Real Export Growth 
 
See notes to Figure 4. 
 
Figure 6: Real Import Growth 
 


































Figure 7:  Aggregate Trade Balance—Deficit countries 
 




Figure 8:  Aggregate Trade Balance – Surplus Countries 
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Figure 9:  Aggregate Trade Balance—Deficit Countries by Region 
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Figure 10:  Aggregate Trade Balance—Surplus Countries by Region 
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Figure 11:  Aggregate Trade Balance—Deficit Countries by Income Level 
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 Figure 12:  Aggregate Trade Balance—Surplus Countries by Income Level 
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Figure 13:  Real Merchandise Trade Growth  
(Calculated from exports in constant 2000 $US) 
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Figure 14: Export Growth by Industry 
(Calculated from exports in constant 2000 $US) 
 
 
Note: Left and right panels are the same except the right excludes fuels, which changes the scale to make 
movements in other sectors more visable. 
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Figure 15: Export Growth by Region 
(Calculated from exports in constant 2000 $US) 
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Figure 16: Export Growth by Income Group 
(Calculated from exports in constant 2000 $US) 
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Figure 17: The Decline in Trade Now and Then 
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